Looking Back to Move Forward: Revisiting the Btu in Evaluating Current Policy Alternatives by Wang, Walter
WANG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2016 2:20 PM 
 
Looking Back to Move Forward: 
Revisiting the Btu in Evaluating Current 
Policy Alternatives 
WALTER WANG* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 182 
II.  THE BTU TAX .................................................................................................... 183 
A. The Original Proposal ............................................................................. 183 
B. The Legislative Train-Wreck .................................................................... 185 
III.  APPLYING LESSONS FROM THE BTU DEBACLE TO CURRENT  
  CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES .................................................................................. 188 
IV.  THE GREAT DEBATE: CAP & TRADE OR CARBON TAX........................................ 190 
A. Cap and Trade ......................................................................................... 190 
B. Carbon Tax .............................................................................................. 191 
1. Simplicity .......................................................................................... 191 
2. Revenue ............................................................................................. 191 
3. Cost Certainty ................................................................................... 192 
4. Transparency .................................................................................... 193 
5. Political Environment for a Carbon Tax........................................... 194 
V.  IS CAP & DIVIDEND THE ANSWER? .................................................................... 195 
VI.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 197 
 
  
 *  Adjunct Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.  I would 
like to thank Professor Karen C. Burke and Professor Lesley K. McAllister for inviting 
me to participate at the Second Annual Climate & Energy Law Symposium at the 
University of San Diego School of Law on April 9, 2010.  
 181 
 
WANG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2016  2:20 PM 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The term “climate change” connotes an area of study to some, is used 
as a scare tactic by others, and is a reality to many.  Estimates regarding 
the extent to which climate change is affecting our planet are subject to 
increasing scrutiny by a watchful public eye, due to the skepticism with 
which research regarding the impact of climate change has been made.1  
However, despite this skepticism, curbing the extent of climate change 
has become one of the most vital missions of our time. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) explained in its Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report2 that climate change will “shape the operating environment, 
roles, and missions” the DoD undertakes and have an impact on the 
department’s facilities and military capabilities.3  The DoD recognized 
that, although climate change does not directly cause conflict, it acts “as 
an accelerant of instability or conflict.”4  In this sense, although there is 
a theoretical debate raging regarding the impact of climate change, it is 
imperative for all members of the global community to work together to 
find a reasonable path to curb and reduce emissions, in order to mitigate 
and reverse the harmful effects of climate change. 
The debate over climate change, its potential impact, and methods of 
mitigating and reversing it, is an international one.  However, each 
nation-state must set its own framework of policies to properly address 
its internal sociopolitical and socioeconomic issues as they relate to 
climate change. 
President Barack Obama ignited the current debate on climate change 
in the United States.  In his inaugural address on January 20, 2009, 
President Obama declared that “each day brings further evidence that the 
ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet.”5  
 1.  Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.N. Panel’s Glacier Warning Is Criticized as Exaggerated, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/ 
science/earth/19climate.html. See also Timothy E. Wirth, C. Boyden Gray & John Podesta, 
The Future of Energy Policy, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 4, 135 (2003) (noting that “the only 
disagreement lies in how fast it is occurring and how much this [climate change] will 
affect the globe”). See also President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 
27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-
union-address. The President noted: “I know that there are those who disagree with the 
overwhelming scientific evidence on climate change.” 
 2.  DEP’T OF DEF. QUADRENNIAL DEF. REVIEW, February 2010, available at http:// 
www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. The Quadrennial Defense  
Review is a legislatively mandated review of the Department of Defense strategy and priorities. 
 3.  Id. at 84–85. 
 4.  Id. 
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Immediately thereafter, the political landscape changed, such that climate 
change, and with it, energy policy, were brought to the fore.6 
To evaluate the current policy alternatives, it is necessary to take a 
step back and revisit the Btu tax proposed by the Clinton Administration.  
Although seventeen years have passed since the Btu tax was proposed, 
and the U.S. is at war in theatres that are much different from those in 
which it was involved during the Clinton Administration, the landscape 
of the climate change debate has not changed dramatically.  The lessons 
learned from the policies espoused by the Btu tax proposal may be critical 
in determining how to best approach climate change legislation today. 
II.  THE BTU TAX 
A.  The Original Proposal 
In his 1993 State of the Union Address, President Clinton proposed 
the Btu tax, which was a broad-based energy tax.7  The purported 
rationale for the broad-based energy tax was “to provide us with revenue 
to lower the deficit because [the tax would] also combat[] pollution, 
promote[] energy efficiency, promote[] the [economic] independence of 
this country, as well as help[] to reduce the debt.”8 
Under Clinton’s proposal, a tax would be imposed on the consumption 
of British thermal units (Btus) of energy.9  Thus, it was a “tax based on 
the heat content or heating potential of a fuel or energy content in the 
form of heat.”10  The proposal applied a 25.7 cents per million Btu tax to 
most fuels, including coal, natural gas, ethanol, and methanol.11  For oil, 
a surcharge of 34.2 cents was added, bringing the tax on oil and oil 
 6.  Wirth, supra note 1, at 135. 
 7.  President William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address (Feb. 17, 1993) (transcript 
available at http://www.c-span.org/Transcripts/SOTU-1993.aspx). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S FEBRUARY BUDGETARY 
PROPOSALS 30 (1993). According to Dictionary.com, “A British Thermal Unit is the 
amount of heat required to raise the temperature of 1 lb. of water 1o F.” 
 10.  Salvatore Lazzari, Energy Tax Policy: An Economic Analysis, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, June 28, 2005, at CR-10. According to the CRS report, 
“one barrel of oil has, on average, about 5.8 million Btu’s, meaning that it has 5.8 
million units of heat capable of raising one pound of water at maximum density by one 
degree Fahrenheit. One short ton of coal (2,000 lbs.) contains about 22 million Btu’s, 
about four times the Btu’s in one barrel of oil. 
 11.  STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., SUMMARY OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S REVENUE, PROPOSALS 61 (1993). 
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derived fuels to 59.9 cents per million Btus.12  The surcharge served two 
purposes—to promote conservation for national security reasons13 and to 
encourage the use of natural gas.14 The proposal also taxed nuclear 
power and hydropower based on the national average of Btus required to 
generate electricity from fossil fuels.15 Fuel from renewable resources, 
including solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass were excluded from the 
imposition of the tax.16 In addition, fuels used for feedstock were exempt 
from the Btu tax.17 The proposal was to be phased in ratably over three 
years and indexed to inflation after full implementation in 1997.18  The 
proposed collection point of the tax was to be as close to the source of 
the energy or as far “upstream” as possible, in order to minimize the 
administrative burden of the tax and influence choices upstream.19 
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) anticipated that the Btu tax 
rates would trigger an increase in the price of gasoline by 7.5 cents per 
gallon, home heating oil by 8.3 cents per gallon, natural gas by 26.5 cents 
per million cubic feet, and residential electricity by 0.3 cents per kilowatt 
hour.20  The price increases would have amounted to an increase in direct 
annual energy costs of less than $100 per household.21  However, the 
total increase in the annual cost of all goods and services would have 
been more than $200 per household.22  The Btu tax was expected to raise 
$22 billion in 1998, when it would have been fully implemented.23  Over 
the five-year period between 1994 and 1998, the Btu tax was expected to 
raise $70 billion. 
As previously noted, the Btu tax was proposed to raise revenue to 
close the deficit and to serve environmental and national security 
purposes.  The Btu tax was considered more politically feasible than a 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  J. Andrew Hoerner & Frank Muller, The Impact of a Broad-Based Energy Tax 
on the Competiveness of U.S. Industry, 59 TAX NOTES 1663, 1664 (1993). 
 14.  Janet E. Milne, Carbon Taxes in the United States: The Context for the Future, 10 
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (2008). 
 15.  See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 11. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Milne, supra note 14, at 13. 
 20.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 9. It is ironic given the current debate 
on climate change legislation that the CBO stated in its analysis that “if it were feasible, 
it would be better to tax the pollution itself instead of the fuel.  The President’s proposal 
would reduce emissions of carbon dioxide less than a carbon content or a flat rate Btu tax 
[…]. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET 
EFFECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S REVENUE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE FISCAL 
YEAR 1994 BUDGET, JCX-2-93 (1993). 
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carbon tax, because it was not expected to anger the members of coal-
rich states such as West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Illinois.24  President 
Clinton stated that the tax “would cost American families with incomes 
under $30,000 nothing”25 due in part to the proposed increase in the 
earned income tax credit, food stamp programs, home energy assistance, 
and home weatherization programs for low-income taxpayers.26 
B.  The Legislative Train-Wreck 
The Btu tax proposal did not survive the legislative process.  Although 
the proposal narrowly survived the House by a vote of 219 to 213, with 
38 Democrats and all Republicans voting against it,27 the Btu proposal 
met its demise in the Senate.  By the time the proposal reached the Senate, a 
significant number of exemptions to the tax had made their way into the 
proposal as originally advanced by President Clinton, turning it into a 
mere skeleton of its former self.  No fewer than thirteen exemptions to 
the tax had been added to the original proposal when the administration 
released a modified version of its original Btu tax.28  Some of the items 
exempted from the imposition of the tax included nonfuel products such 
as asphalt, lubricants, and waxes, coal used in the production of synthetic 
natural gas, coal seam methane from operating mines, natural gas used in 
enhanced oil recovery for heavy oil, and ethanol.29  Other modifications to 
the original proposal included an exemption for home heating fuel from 
the supplemental rate, the shift of the tax downstream to the refiners and 
suppliers of the refined products, and exemptions related to the production 
of feedstock.30  Although the House Ways and Means Committee rejected 
the exemption for ethanol,31 the Administration’s willingness to make 
 24.  Martin A. Sullivan, Gas Tax Politics, Part I, 120 TAX NOTES 1331, 1337 
(2008).  See also Dawn Erlandson, The Btu Tax Experience: What Happened and Why it 
Happened, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 173, 175 (1994). 
 25.  Clinton, supra note 7. 
 26.  Milne, supra note 14, at 15. 
 27.  HOUSE NARROWLY PASSES CLINTON RECONCILIATION PACKAGE, FEDERAL TAX 
DAY, 93TAX DAY Item # C.1, May 28, 1993 (CCH). 
 28.  TREASURY PROVIDES DETAILS OF ENERGY TAX PROPOSAL, FEDERAL TAX DAY, 
93 TAX DAY Item #T.1, Apr. 2, 1993 (CCH). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Hoerner, supra note 13, at 1665 (noting that ethanol production is so energy 
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revisions to the proposal in exchange for votes was a miscalculation that 
emboldened the opposition.32  
Even before the vote in the House, the Btu tax was subject to criticism 
from many different ideological groups.  Hydropower, in particular, came 
under fire.  Pursuant to the terms of the proposal, hydropower was subject 
to the Btu tax based on the rate applicable to fossil fuels, rather than the 
Btu content of the power generated.  To illustrate, one kilowatt hour (kWh) 
of hydropower has a maximum Btu content of 3,410 Btus.33 However, 
because hydropower was to be taxed at the fossil fuel rate, each kWh 
produced would be taxed as though it had generated 10,000 to 12,000 
Btus, roughly three times the actual amount of heat content produced by 
hydropower.34  Although this discrepancy in the application of the tax 
seemed unreasonable to some, others argued that it was appropriate for 
policy reasons to tax hydropower at the fossil fuel rate because of 
the harmful effects hydropower imposes on the environment—such as 
declines in fisheries, species diversity, riparian habitat, and water quality.35  
A variety of other industry groups emerged to fight the Btu tax, claiming 
that the tax would increase the cost of producing energy, hurt competition, 
and reduce jobs.36  For example, the National Association of Manufacturers 
formed the Affordable Energy Alliance, which included over nine hundred 
businesses and groups, to oppose the tax.37  The Independent Petroleum 
Association declined to join the Alliance, and instead pushed for the 
movement of the collection point downstream to the refiners and 
distributors.38  However, the Btu tax did find some unlikely supporters in 
major automotive companies such as Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, 
as they hoped that the implementation of the Btu tax would avoid the 
increase of fuel economy standards.39  
 Feedstock exemptions from taxation or climate change legislation may 
typically be justified on environmental grounds, because the physical 
components of fuel that are incorporated into the final product are not 
released into the environment.40  However, some of the exemptions for 
 32.  Milne, supra note 14, at 13. See also Erlandson, supra note 24, at 177. 
 33.  Romano L. Mazzoli, Mazzoli Constituent Criticizes Btu Tax’s Impact on 
Hydropower, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 153-21 (1993).  See also Erlandson, supra note 24, at 
178. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Daniel A. Lashof, The Btu Tax: A Revenue Source That Fights Pollution, 59 
TAX NOTES 1271, 1273 (1993). 
 36.  Erlandson, supra note 24, at 179. 
 37.  Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements 
in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 541 (1998). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Milne, supra note 14, at 18. 
 40.  Hoerner, supra note 13, at 1678. 
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feedstock from the Btu tax carried no environmental justification.41  
However, industry argued that the fuel would be used for a nonfuel 
purpose and consequently should be exempted as a feedstock.  This is 
particularly true of coal used in the steel industry, where the coal is used 
to drive chemical reactions, but only a small percentage of the coal is 
actually incorporated into the steel.42  
In addition to the exemptions incorporated into the Btu tax proposal 
for the non-policy reasons set forth above, the modified Btu proposal 
shifted the collection point downstream from the wellhead and mine-
mouth to the electric utility, local distribution company, or end-user 
depending on the type of resource.  Collection of the tax upstream would 
have ensured that the tax could be collected easily, but also would have 
ensured that all fuels would be taxed, including oil consumed in the field 
and refineries during the production of the refined products.43  The 
movement of the collection point downstream would have undoubtedly 
increased the cost of compliance.  No study was conducted to estimate 
how much it would have cost the taxpayer to comply.  However, some 
scholars claimed that the Btu tax had the potential to cost the 
government between $1 to $2 billion per year, easily dwarfing the cost 
of the mandatory price control program imposed on the oil industry from 
1971 to 1980.44   
Despite having passed the House, the Btu tax was met with resistance 
in the Senate.  The Democrats only held a slim majority on the Senate 
Finance Committee, and industry opposition targeted Senators from oil 
producing states.45 The opposition found a friend in Senator David 
Boren of Oklahoma.46 It was estimated that the Btu tax would cost 
11,000 jobs or 1 percent of Oklahoma’s work force.47  In breaking ranks, 
Boren joined with Senator John Danforth of Missouri and put forth an 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Lashof, supra note 35. See also Hoerner, supra note 38, at 1678 (noting in the 
case of steel, “coke is used as a chemical reagent to reduce iron ore to obtain elemental 
iron”).  Hoerner also cites aluminum as a similar example. 
 43.  Hoerner, supra note 13, at 1664.  See also Lashof, supra note 35, at 1273. 
 44.  Philip K. Verleger, Jr., The Btu Tax: Bad Tax Policy, Terrible Economic Policy, 
Worse Environmental Policy, and Even Worse Energy Policy, 59 TAX NOTES 1691, 1693 
(1993). 
 45.  Sullivan, supra note 24. 
 46.  Erlandson, supra note 24, at 181. 
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alternative proposal for reducing the deficit.48  In the end, the Senate 
Finance Committee struck down the Btu tax and agreed on a 4.3 cent per 
gallon increase in the gasoline tax, though this too was met with resistance 
by some senators who claimed that it would hurt rural states such as 
Montana, Arkansas, North Dakota, and Wyoming more than other states.49 
Overall, although the Btu tax proposal initially introduced by the Clinton 
Administration would have reduced both the deficit and pollution, the 
acquiescence of the Administration to various modifications to the proposal, 
especially those to include the various exemptions to the Btu tax outlined 
above, caused the proposal to be defeated in the Senate due to opposition 
from various industries. 
III.  APPLYING LESSONS FROM THE BTU DEBACLE TO CURRENT 
CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES 
Now that climate change legislation has been put back on the table, what 
lessons can we take away from the Btu tax proposal?  First, and perhaps 
most importantly, there must be a singular purpose for the legislation.  
Second, any tax imposed by the legislation must be collected in the most 
efficient manner possible. 
The Btu tax had two primary goals: deficit reduction and pollution 
reduction.  However, these goals created different camps of supporters 
and opponents, and with each modification to the original proposal, the 
grumblings from the various camps grew larger.50  If the true purpose of 
the legislation were deficit reduction, it would have been better to 
declare it as such when it was first introduced, much like the imposition 
of the first federal gas tax. However, if the Btu tax were to truly serve an 
environmental purpose, greater attention would have been paid to 
determine the appropriate tax rate.51 
Use of the revenue from the Btu tax for deficit reduction purposes 
neglected the overall effect of the tax, which would have been an 
increase in the overall cost of commodities and a decrease in the real 
after-tax wage.52  Although the Clinton proposal featured an increase in 
the earned income tax credit and other funding for low-income families, 
the revenue from the Btu tax was not specifically dedicated to such 
 48.  Barbara Kirchheimer & Rita L. Zeidner, Btu Tax in Jeopardy After Key Senate 
Democrats Defect, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 109-1 (1993). 
 49.  Sen. Max Baucus, Baucus Attacks Energy Tax Policy, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 
144–80 (1993). 
 50.  See generally Erlandson, supra note 24, at 182. 
 51.  Milne, supra note 14, at 14. 
 52.  Lawrence H. Goulder, Energy Taxes: Traditional Efficiency Effects 
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relief.  However, because the proposal included new revenue from other 
sources, this “allowed the Administration to argue that it was protecting 
low income households.”53  Many proponents of a tax on energy believe 
that such a tax should be revenue-neutral while others believe that such 
taxes should partially be dedicated to the environmental problem.54 
However, the use of the Btu tax to benefit the environment is also 
somewhat misleading, as a Btu tax is not considered to be a Pigouvian55 
tax, because it does not attempt to tax market activity that would otherwise 
generate negative externalities.56  According to the Congressional Budget 
Office, the Btu tax would have only had a slight positive environmental 
impact.57 If the Clinton Administration truly desired to benefit the 
environment through the imposition of the Btu tax, it would have been 
unwilling to accept many of the proposed exemptions to the application 
of the tax.  In that scenario, the Administration might have been better 
off had it proposed a carbon tax, which would have reduced emissions of 
carbon dioxide more than the proposed Btu tax.58 
As noted above, the second lesson that may be gleaned from the 
failure of the Btu tax proposal is that tax collection should occur at its 
most efficient point.  Most would consider this to be upstream in the 
consumption chain, where collection and monitoring costs can be 
minimized and maximum coverage will be ensured.59  The Btu tax, as 
originally proposed, was to be collected upstream.  However, as with the 
numerous exemptions that were granted, the collection point became 
negotiable as well.60  This is evidenced by the fact that the collection 
point for natural gas, coal, and electricity moved downstream, with the 
responsibility for collection falling upon the various points downstream 
such as the electric utility, local distribution company, or end-user 
depending on the type of resource.61  This move upset environmental 
 53.  Milne, supra note 14, at 16. 
 54.  Id. 
 55. A Pigouvian tax is a tax levied on a market activity, which if unregulated, generates 
negative externalities. If the tax is equal to the negative externality of the market activity, 
it is thought to correct the market outcome back to efficiency. 
 56.  Roberta Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics and 
Find Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,118, 10,124 (2009). 
 57.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 9. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 523 (2009). 
 60.  Milne, supra note 14, at 13. 
 61.  See TAX DAY, supra note 28. See also Milne, supra note 14, at 13. 
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groups who argued for more upstream or midstream collection to encourage 
a shift towards cleaner energy.62 
Although the Btu tax was defeated in the Senate and was thus never 
enacted, the negotiations surrounding the Clinton Administration’s proposal 
and the failings of the proposal are invaluable, as they may prevent the 
proponents of current climate change legislation from making the same 
errors in judgment.  First, it is imperative that current climate change 
legislation only have environmental benefits as its goal.  Second, the 
legislation must require that any tax or funds payable pursuant to the 
legislation be collected at the most efficient point, thus reducing 
implementation costs and increasing the monetary benefit of the legislation 
to the government.  The only question that truly remains is whether a 
carbon tax or a cap and trade system will best meet these two criteria. 
IV.  THE GREAT DEBATE: CAP & TRADE OR CARBON TAX 
An ongoing debate has centered around whether to implement a cap 
and trade regime or a carbon tax to adequately address climate change.  
There are supporters and detractors on both sides.63  The goal of this 
article is to discuss briefly the trendy popularity of a cap and trade system 
and the merits of a carbon tax, explain the political climate within which 
these two proposals are being advanced, and examine an alternative 
proposal that may be the best and yet least recognized proposal currently 
before the U.S. Senate. 
A.  Cap and Trade 
Much like a fashion trend, cap and trade is currently in vogue.  
However, trends fade, and so too may interest in cap and trade.  The 
fascination with cap and trade in the U.S. stems from the global regimes 
already in place in Europe and the ability to integrate a cap and trade 
system in the U.S. with a global system already in existence.  Just as the 
imposition of the United States’ form of democracy in other nations is 
not necessarily successful, the implementation of a cap and trade system 
in the U.S. may not be appropriate, even though such a system has 
proven beneficial in Europe. 
Recent cap and trade proposals are exceedingly complex; the one that 
immediately comes to mind is the Waxman-Markey bill (HR 2454).  At 
1,428 pages, the bill is long and complex.  The Waxman-Markey bill has 
 62.  Milne, supra note 14, at 13–14. 
 63.  This debate has been the subject of numerous scholarly articles and need not 
be rehashed here. 
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been called the energy and climate policy equivalent of Sarbanes Oxley, 
since the bill would create a large bureaucratic structure and impose 
substantial costs on the economy.64  A competing Senate bill is the 
Kerry-Lieberman bill, which is 987 pages, and does not truly simplify 
the creation of a cap and trade system within the United States, relative 
to the Waxman-Markey bill.  Thus, a cap and trade system would inherently 
violate at least one the lessons learned from the Btu tax, namely, simplicity 
of collection and corresponding reduction of administrative costs. 
Therefore, if the unsuitability of the cap and trade system for the United 
States is accepted, the leading alternative for climate change legislation 
would be the carbon tax.  What then are the benefits of a carbon tax? 
B.  Carbon Tax 
1.  Simplicity 
A carbon tax is simple.  A tax rate is set at $X per ton of carbon emitted 
from the dominant sources of CO2 in the economy, namely coal, oil, and 
natural gas.65  The tax can be imposed upstream and credits can be 
allowed for carbon sequestration projects and other ventures that reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.66  Moreover, implementation of a carbon tax 
is straightforward,67 especially in comparison with a cap and trade 
system, since it would utilize an existing administrative structure, the 
IRS, to collect the tax.68 
2.  Revenue 
A carbon tax would generate a significant amount of revenue that could 
then be used to offset the regressive nature of the tax and encourage the 
research and development of clean energy technologies.  According to 
 64.  Steven F. Hayward & Kenneth P. Green, Waxman-Markey: An Exercise in 
Unreality, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, No. 3, at 2 July 
2009. 
 65.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: 
Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade 39 
(Univ. of Mich. Law School, Working Paper No. 117, 2008). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  A more recent carbon tax proposal is a mere 17 pages long. 
 68.  Price Volatility in Climate Change Legislation: Hearing Before the Committee on 
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the Congressional Research Service, recent carbon tax proposals from 
the 110th Congress would have generated between $69 billion and $126 
billion in 2015.69  At the upper range, that is almost fifty percent of the 
amount of revenues received from corporate income taxes for the 2005 
fiscal year. 
A cap and trade system, may, in theory, provide similar levels of revenue.  
However, given the experience in Europe under the EU Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) and the provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill, 
many of the initial allowances would be provided for free, thus generating 
substantially less revenue to combat the regressive effects of the system, 
support research and development, and encourage carbon sequestration 
activities. 
3.  Cost Certainty 
A carbon tax ensures that the cost of producing carbon is certain.  
Simply stated, the cost of the tax is equal to the amount of the tax and 
the incidence of the tax.70  The cost is dictated by the tax rate and thus 
enables businesses to plan ahead and include the imposition of the tax in 
their cost projections.71  Under a cap and trade system, however, the cost 
of carbon emissions is necessarily volatile and thus discourages businesses 
from investment, as they have less reliable cost information available 
with which to plan for capital improvements.72  Issues in price volatility 
in a cap and trade system are not new.  The EU ETS has demonstrated 
wide swings in price.  In April 2006, the price of CO2 permits dropped 
when it was announced that the amount of permits allocated in Phase I 
were overly generous.73  Futures prices dropped from € 32.90 on April 
20th to € 18.90 on May 3rd.74 More recently, as a result of the global 
economic downturn, the price per permit fell to € 11.63 in January 2009 
and by February 2009 had sunk to € 8.20.75  The U.S. has not been 
immune to such price volatility.  Under a limited cap and trade system 
 69.  JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, CARBON 
TAX AND GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL: OPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 37 
(2009). 
 70.  Avi-Yonah, supra note 65, at 43–44. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Ramseur, supra note 69, at 15. 
 73.  Metcalf, supra note 59, at 3.  However, as Ramseur, supra, note 69, points out, 
the price volatility during the EU Phase I period (2005-2007) may not be an appropriate 
comparison as the volatility was related to program design issues. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  James Kanter, Carbon Prices Tumble as Global Downturn Bites, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 21, 2009, (Green Blog), available at  http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/21/carbon- 
prices-tumble-as-global-downturn-bites/. See also the European Climate Exchange for 
historical price data, available at http://www.ecx.eu/EUA-Futures. 
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for the California Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), 
prices skyrocketed from around $5,000 per ton of NOx to almost $45,000 
per ton in 2000.76  The imposition of a carbon tax system would avoid these 
extreme changes in the cost of carbon emissions, and thus would provide 
a much more stable environment for the investment of capital in business. 
4.  Transparency 
Though a carbon tax may become more complex if credits against the 
tax are available and exemptions are permitted, such complexity may 
pale in comparison to a cap and trade system, in which there will 
necessarily be many moving parts, some of which may be included to 
improve efficiency and control price volatility.77  In a cap and trade system, 
allowances may be treated as commodities, thus encouraging rent-
seeking behavior. However, under a carbon tax, rent-seeking78 behavior 
would be minimized, because industry would lack the same profit 
potential from such behavior, due to an inability to commoditize any credit 
or exemption available with respect to the carbon tax.79  Thus, a cap and 
trade system would not be as transparent as a carbon tax system due to its 
complexity, thus creating opportunities for gamesmanship and fraud.80 
Questions of fraud have surrounded the EU ETS.  According to the 
European law enforcement agency, Europol, tax fraud associated with 
trading of allowances cost over $6.5 million over an 18-month period.81  
Under this particular scheme, the perpetrators acquired the allowances 
without paying the value added tax (VAT) and then resold the permits 
with the VAT included, only to disappear before remitting the tax to the 
 76.  Metcalf, supra note 68 at 3.  See also Tietenberg, infra note 78, at 381, where 
it is noted that the dramatic price increase triggered a safety valve mechanism which 
continued to place pressure on the covered entities to reduce emissions without 
“straining the system beyond its tolerance limits.”   
 77.  Ramseur, supra note 74, at 16. 
 78.  Rent seeking is defined as “the use of resources in lobbying and other activities 
directed at securing protective legislation.”  If successful, such activity increases “the net 
benefits going to the special interest group, but it will also frequently lower net benefits to 
society as a whole.”  See Tom Tietenberg, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, 
ADDISON WESLEY (6th ed. 2003), at 78.   
 79.  Mann, supra note 56, at 10,123. 
 80.  Ramseur, supra note 69, at 16. See also Mann, supra note 56, at 10,123. 
 81.  Knowledge@Wharton, Combating Complexities of Carbon Fraud, FORBES, 
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government.82  Even more disturbing, according to Europol, in some 
countries upwards of 90% of total trading volume was a result of 
fraudulent activity.83  In early 2010, the EU ETS was the subject of an e-
mail phishing scam through which the perpetrators acquired access 
codes for individual accounts on national registries and subsequently 
sold the permits through accounts registered in Denmark and Great 
Britain.84  Even the limited RECLAIM market in Southern California 
was not immune to fraudulent activity.  Anne Masters Sholtz, a former 
Caltech economist who helped design the RECLAIM system, defrauded 
various creditors out of almost $80 million.85 
The creation of permits or allowances within a cap and trade system 
results in the creation of yet another financial instrument that may be the 
subject of manipulation and fraud, similar to sub-prime mortgages, 
collateralized debt-obligations, and credit default swaps.86  The possibility 
of fraud and manipulation of the allowance market are the potential 
uncertainties faced under a cap and trade system.  Alternatively, under a 
carbon tax, none of this uncertainty would exist.  Those entities upon 
which a carbon tax would be imposed could be required to register with 
the IRS, similar to the registration required for entities obligated to pay 
the fuels tax.87 
5.  Political Environment for a Carbon Tax 
Is this much ado about nothing?  The prevailing belief is that a carbon 
tax is not politically feasible simply because it contains the word “tax.”88  
The mid-term elections will be held this year, so politicians are 
understandably shying away from the enactment of any legislation that 
could be characterized as a “tax increase.” Similarly, while cap and trade 
appeared to be a popular solution for combating climate change in 2009, 
it has effectively been branded as “cap and tax” by its opponents.89  In 
 82.  James Kanter, Fraud Besets E.U. Carbon Trade System, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/08/business/energyand-environment/ 
08green.html. 
 83.  Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 81. 
 84.  Kanter, supra note 82. 
 85.  Ex-Caltech Economist Guilty in Fraud Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at 
B4. See also Kevin Ulrich, Breaking the Smog Bank, PASADENA WKLY., May 14, 2009, 
available at http://www.pasadenaweekly.com/cms/story/detail/breaking_the_smog_bank/ 
7239/. 
 86.  Metcalf, supra note 68, at 6. 
 87.  I.R.C. § 4101 (West 2010). 
 88.  Ramseur, supra note 69, at 20. 
 89.  John M. Broder, Cap and Trade Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy of 
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reality, cap and trade would impose costs on the economy and those costs 
would likely be borne by the ultimate consumer.  In essence, a carbon 
tax system and a cap and trade system may have similar effects, in that 
the ultimate cost would be passed on to the consumer.  In this 
political climate, although the cap and trade system would be infinitely 
more complex, though more widely discussed, it is unlikely that even the 
simpler carbon tax will be passed by Congress. 
V.  IS CAP & DIVIDEND THE ANSWER? 
The political unwillingness to enact a carbon tax simply because it is a 
“tax” may be real or perceived.  Be that as it may, politics is based on 
perception and a “tax” may be a hard pill to swallow for many members 
of Congress given the current political climate.  Although a carbon tax 
would be preferable if the political climate could sustain it, it may be 
possible to design a cap and trade system that is simple and achieves an 
incremental reduction in greenhouse gases.  The Carbon Limits and Energy 
for America’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act (S. 2877) sponsored by Senator 
Maria Cantwell of Washington and Senator Susan Collins of Maine 
attempts to do just that. 
The CLEAR Act is a thirty-nine page piece of legislation which has 
apparently been described by President Obama as “very elegant.”90  
Instead of proposing a cap and trade system, the Act proposes a cap and 
dividend system.  The CLEAR Act targets a reduction in greenhouse gases, 
but only to the extent that they constitute carbon dioxide emissions from 
what the Act calls “fossil carbon.”  Fossil carbon includes carbon in the 
form of a fossil fuel such as coal, natural gas, crude oil and the carbon 
content of imported refined fuel products.  The Act sets forth the following 
timeline for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions: (1) in 2020, 20% 
below 2005 levels; (2) in 2025, 30% below 2005 levels; (3) in 2030, 32% 
below 2005 levels; and (4) in 2050, 83% below 2005 levels. 
The limitations will apply upstream to the “first seller” at the wellhead, 
mine entrance, or the port of entry.  Under the CLEAR Act, all carbon 
shares (allowances) will be auctioned off with an initial floor price of $7 
and ceiling price of $21 beginning in 2012.  The floor price and ceiling 
price will increase each year by the rate of inflation, plus the rate of 
capital investment, and increased by 0.5 percent.  In the event the first 
 90.  Id. 
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seller cannot submit the appropriate number of carbon shares to the 
appropriate governmental authority, the first seller is subject to a penalty 
in the amount of the number of shares the first seller failed to remit, 
multiplied by five times the auction price on the date closest to the non-
compliance date.  The Act includes a safety valve provision,91 such that 
if the “safety valve price” is met in any one auction, the number of 
available carbon shares may be increased to ensure all legal bids at the 
safety valve price can be accommodated. 
To combat the regressive impact the cap would impose on society, a 
Carbon Refund Trust Fund would be set up, to which 75% of the auction 
proceeds will be transferred.  The proceeds would then be distributed to 
all legal residents of the U.S. as a nontaxable “energy security dividend.”  
A separate fund, the Clean Energy Reinvestment Trust Fund (CERT 
Fund) would also be set up to which the remaining 25% of auction proceeds 
would be transferred.  In addition, all penalties, safety valve revenues 
and border fees would be transferred to the CERT Fund.  Expenditures 
from the CERT Fund would go towards relief for exporters, region specific 
transition assistance for those regions economically dislocated as a result 
of the cap, support training of workers for the green economy, the 
provision of financial assistance to low income families, and funding for 
clean energy research, development, and deployment.  In addition, safety 
valve revenues would be used solely for offset-related projects, as 
offsets are not permitted for compliance purposes of the cap. 
The CLEAR Act is a model of simplicity, but its likelihood of passage 
is in doubt, as the trade winds favor complex and onerous legislation.  
The Act attempts to combat the regressive nature of the cap, stimulates 
investment in clean technology, and limits the potential for fraud.  Because 
the initial floor price is low, it is unlikely to cause immediate change, 
though it is anticipated to ease the economy at large into a carbon 
constrained economy without a shock.  While the CLEAR Act sets forth 
a general framework for the cap and dividend system, if it were passed, 
many of the details would be the subject of a voluminous set of 
regulations.  It is currently unclear whether certain programs designed to 
stimulate investment in clean energy technology would be administered 
through a direct government grant or through the Internal Revenue Code 
as a credit, deduction or refundable credit, although this issue too may be 
addressed in regulations. 
 91.  See Metcalf, supra note 68, at 4 (where the author notes that a safety valve 
provision “allows firms to purchase an unlimited number of permits at a set price and 
thus sets a ceiling on the price of permits.  If the market price for permits is below the 
safety valve price, then firms will simply purchase permits on the open market.  Once 
permit prices reach the value of the safety valve, firms will purchase any needed permits 
from the government.”). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Btu tax proposal and its subsequent failure provide context and 
lessons for the current debate on climate change—namely, to have a 
singular purpose, make it revenue neutral, and impose the policy at the 
most efficient point of collection.  While legislators continue to debate 
the appropriate mechanism to combat climate change, our society is moving 
closer to the tipping point at which the effects of climate change will be 
irreversible.  The environmental benefits of each of a carbon tax, cap and 
trade system, or cap and dividend system are measurable, though they 
are more certain under a cap and trade or cap and dividend system.  
However, a cap and trade system, such as the system recently proposed 
in Congress, would contain complexities that may lead to inefficient 
administration, and worse yet, fraud.  While it may not be politically 
feasible to enact a carbon tax, it would be less complex, provide revenue, 
provide cost certainty, and would be more transparent than the alternatives. 
In lieu of a carbon tax, the CLEAR Act provides the best alternative to 
the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman cap and trade bills.  Although it 
is not a tax per se, the CLEAR Act sets forth a simple framework that 
attempts to take into consideration the lessons of the Btu tax.  It is 
simple, largely revenue neutral, has a singular purpose, and would be 
imposed upstream.  The CLEAR Act is less complex than the Waxman-
Markey bill or the proposed Kerry-Lieberman bill; however, a portion of 
revenue from the imposition of the cap will be siphoned off for the 
administration of the Act.  There is no doubt that with a carbon tax, there 
would be an administrative burden on both the IRS and the taxpayer, but 
such burden could be minimized.  The CLEAR Act is a viable alternative 
and could ease the overall economy into a culture of carbon constraint.  
The fact that it only caps carbon dioxide emissions initially is irrelevant, 
as other emissions can be capped over time, assuming the system put 
into place under the CLEAR Act is successful with respect to carbon 
dioxide emissions.  In the absence of a carbon tax, the CLEAR Act may 
be the best alternative to effect meaningful climate change.  It is unfortunate 
that the CLEAR Act has neither received the recognition nor the 
consideration that it deserves. 
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